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ANTITRUST IMMUNITY OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF SECURITIES DEALERS UNDER THE MALONEY ACT
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs in Harwell v. Growth Programs, Inc.' were investors who
had held single investment contract plans' in Technology Fund, Inc.
(the Fund), an open-end mutual fund. Plaintiffs originally brought a
class action on behalf of all those who had purchased single investment
contract plans in the Fund. Named as defendants in the case were the
Fund, Supervised Investors Services, Inc. (Supervised), Growth Pro-
grams, Inc. (Growth) and the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. (NASD). Supervised was the management company
operating the Fund. Growth, a subsidiary of Supervised, was a regis-
tered broker-dealer who sold the contract plans to the plaintiffs .°
The single investment contract plans purchased by plaintiffs con-
tained withdrawal and reinvestment clauses.' Growth and Supervised
had devised single investment plans in the Fund which permitted an
investor to withdraw, for an unlimited number of times, up to ninety
percent of his shares and subsequently to reinvest an equivalent amount
of cash. ° Withdrawal and reinvestment clauses had been included in
investment contracts since the 1930's so that investors would have ready
access to cash in the case of serious financial emergencies.° A typical
withdrawal and reinvestment clause permitted an investor to reinvest
in the fund the same amount which he had earlier withdrawn from it
without paying the brokerage fee usually exacted for such investments.
Thus the purchasers of the contract plans in question in Harwell could
rely on the provision in order to withdraw up to ninety percent of their
shares and then reinvest them without paying additional sales commis-
sions.'
1 451 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd on rehearing, 459 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3187 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1972).
2 Mutual fund shares are usually sold wholesale by the fund's management company
to broker-dealers. The broker-dealers in turn offer them retail to the public. An additional
method of offering fund shares is through "contract plans," where a plan certificate
evidencing a beneficial interest in a specified amount of fund shares is sold. The holder
of such a plan certificate has the option of redeeming his certificate for the underlying
shares themselves or their cash value. "Single investment" contract plans are plans for
which the holder pays a single lump sum of money. 451 F.2d at 243.
3 Id. at 242-43. Sec Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 Va. L. Rev.
181, 182-88 (1961). The relationships between the Fund, Supervised and Growth are
not unusual. The mutual fund itself is considered to be a cluster of individual service
arrangements with benefits similar to those accruing from private investment counseling.
The large number of separate investors together create sufficient capital for significant
market operations. Since withdrawals of investors' money from the fund decrease the
total capital used for investment purposes and increase the necessity for liquid assets
held by the fund, large-scale withdrawals are obviously financially undesirable.
4 451 F.2d at 243.
5 Harwell v. Growth Programs, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1184, 1185-86 (W.D. Tex. 1970).
6 Id.
7 Id.
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For some time after June, 1965, plaintiffs and other investors fre-
quently used the "in-and-out" privilege allowed by the withdrawal and
reinvestment clauses, and evidence later showed that some of the inves-
tors did so in order to play short swings of the stock market.' The net
asset value of mutual fund shares was calculated twice a day, once at
1:00 P.M., becoming effective at 2:00 P.M., and again at 3:30 P.M.,
becoming effective at 4:30 P.M. Because of the reinvestment provisions
in his contract plan, an investor could withdraw his interest and reinvest
within the space of an hour.' The system of pricing the net asset value,
together with the in-and-out privilege, guaranteed a profit for partici-
pating investors; in short, the combination of factors was ideal for specu-
lation upon the stock market, especially in a short, downswing situa-
tion.'° This type of downward-swing, guaranteed speculation became a
matter of concern for both the NASD and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) 1 1 The NASD issued an interpretation of Section 1
of Article III of its Rules of Fair Practice, effective August 1, 1966,
which deemed "inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade"
the action of any NASD member in furthering withdrawal and rein-
statement privileges as they had been practiced under the provisions of
the contract plans in question. 12 The effect of the issuance of this in-
terpretation by the NASD was to prevent broker-dealers such as
Growth from honoring the in-and-out privilege in the contract plans.
In the United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas, plaintiffs brought an action for breach of contract against Growth
and its parent company, Supervised, and sought a declaratory judgment
that their contracts were valid, specific performance of the contracts by
the brokers and an injunction forbidding the NASD to use the interpre-
tation to deny plaintiffs their in-and-out privileges.' 3 Plaintiffs also al-
leged that the NASD had tortiously interfered with their contractual
relations." Finally, plaintiffs sought treble damages from all of the de-
8
 Id.
9 451 F.2d at 245 n.2.
10 A simple hypothetical is useful to illustrate the speculative nature of the arrange-
ment in issue in Harwell. An investor would know that the current net asset value per
share was $100 and that the new net asset value to go into effect in one hour was $90.
Ile therefore could order up to ninety percent of his holdings sold at the old net asset
value, $100, and buy back in at the new net asset value, $90, after the new price went
into effect. This would increase his quantitative holdings and eventually his total
investment if the net asset value later rose again to its former levels.
11
 National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Reprint of the Manual 5089-90
(August 1969). The NASD was concerned about the turnover taking place in individual
investment companies that offered this type of plan as well as the fact that the manage-
ment was forced to maintain higher than normal liquid positions in order to redeem
shares. The NASD also expressed concern with the fact that the interests of other
individuals in the fund would be hurt because their proportionate holdings would
decrease, while the speculators' holdings would increase.
12 Id. at 5090-92.
18 315 F. Supp. at 1187.
14 Id.
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fendants on the ground that their action constituted conspiracy in viola-
tion of the antitrust laws." The NASD and the defendant broker-dealers
admitted that plaintiffs' contracts had been breached but raised as a de-
fense public policy considerations arising from the Maloney Act."
Growth and Supervised maintained that the NASD interpretation plain-
tiffs complained of was a valid exercise of NASD's quasi-governmental
function under the Maloney Act, and that their compliance with the in-
terpretation did not constitute a breach of contract." The NASD argued
that its interference with plaintiffs' contracts was not actionable because
that interference constituted a proper exercise of delegated authority
under the Maloney Act." Growth and Supervised joined the NASD in
contending that plaintiffs showed no antitrust violation, and that even
if such a violation were demonstrated, the NASD and its members were
immune from antitrust penalties while acting pursuant to the Maloney
Act."
The district court in Harwell conceded that the plaintiffs' contracts
had been breached.° However, the court held that under the Maloney
Act the NASD interpretation constituted a quasi-governmental regula-
tion of the over-the-counter securities market. 2 ' Since the regulatory
power is exercised by the NASD under the supervision of the SEC, the
court reasoned, the NASD was immune from antitrust claims.22 The
district court interpreted the leading case dealing with the application of
antitrust law in the securities area, Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,23
as providing guidelines in quasi-governmental regulatory body rule-
making. 24 Interpreting Silver as granting antitrust immunity to the stock
exchanges because of the close supervision of the SEC over exchange
activities, the court ruled that by following the procedures established
under the Maloney Act under the supervision of the SEC, the NASD
had not violated plaintiffs' rights under the antitrust laws. The district
court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment."
The Fifth Circuit rejected the district court's contention that the
15 Id.
15
 Id. The provisions of the Maloney Act of 1938 are contained in 48 Stat. 881, 15
U.S.C. § 78o, o-3, q, cc, ff (1970). The Maloney Act, which regulates the over-the-
counter market, is actually a 1938 amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
In this comment, citations to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a et
seq. (1970), refer to those provisions, exclusive of the Maloney Act, which apply to
the regulation of stock exchanges.
17 451 F.2d at 244.
18 Id.
19 Id,
25 315 F. Supp. at 1192.
21 Id. at 1191.
22 Id .
28 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
24 315 F. Supp. at 1191.
25 Id. at 1192.
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case lent itself to disposal by summary judgment. The court noted that
there were difficult issues in Harwell which could be resolved only after
a trial on the merits." It agreed with the district court in rejecting
plaintiffs' contention that the case was essentially a simple breach of
contract action." It then determined, however, that plaintiffs' antitrust
claim" presented significant problems which had to be dealt with, espe-
cially the NASD's allegation of antitrust immunity because of the
Maloney Act." The court pointed out that the Maloney Act does not
protect all NASD activities from antitrust charges,3° and suggested that
the scope of the NASD's antitrust immunity should be gauged by the
standards which the Supreme Court applied to stock exchanges under
the Securities Exchange Act in Silver." Because of the broad issues in-
volved, the court of appeals remanded the case for trial on the merits.'
Subsequently the court of appeals affirmed this disposition after having
granted a rehearing; the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
The difficult issue raised in Harwell involved the scope of express
or implied antitrust immunity which the Maloney Act grants to the
NASD in its regulatory activities. This comment will examine this
broad issue. Specifically, it will analyze the Fifth Circuit's suggested
application to the NASD of the antitrust immunity standards pertain-
ing to stock exchanges that are set forth in the landmark Silver decision.
This analysis first seeks to determine which of the several interpreta-
tions of Silver set forth by courts and commentators should be applied.
Second, it attempts to resolve the question whether the appropriate
Silver standard is applicable to the NASD in light of the differences be-
tween the provisions regulating stock exchanges in the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and the provisions of the Maloney Act. The resolu-
tion of this question necessitates a discussion of the impact of the re-
pealer provision' contained in the Maloney Act, to which there is no
analogous provision in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Finally, the
comment will apply the conclusions of the foregoing analysis to the fact
situation in. Harwell and suggest how the central antitrust issue of the
case should be decided.
I. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange: THE SCOPE OF
ANTITRUST IMMUNITY OF THE STOCK EXCHANGES
A. The Silver Decision
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, relied on in both the district
court and the appellate decisions in Harwell, concerned the scope of
28 451 F.2d at 242.
27 Id. at 244.
28
 Plaintiffs' argument was based on a theory of a concerted refusal to deal. 315
F. Supp. at 1191.
28 451 F.2d at 244-45.
80 Id. at 246.
87 15 U.S.C. 111 78a et seq. (1970).
82 451 F.2d at 246-47.
33 15 U.S.C. I 78o-3(n) (1970).
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antitrust immunity provided to stock exchanges as a result of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934. In Silver, plaintiff, a Texas over-the-counter
securities dealer who was not a member of the New York Stock Ex-
change, had private wires installed between his offices and those of sev-
eral member firms of the New York Stock Exchange. The Exchange
gave temporary approval for these private wires as well as a ticker ser-
vice. The Exchange subsequently disapproved of the private wires and
other services without giving prior notice or explanation to the parties
involved." Plaintiff's brokerage business suffered as a result of his in-
ability to follow New York Stock Exchange price movements with the
same degree of ease as when he had direct wire connections. The ag-
grieved nonmember dealer brought an action against the Exchange, al-
leging violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act•" The New
York Stock Exchange answered that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
presented a regulatory scheme which precluded antitrust claims against
the Exchange: the pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme of the Act
exempted the Exchange from antitrust liability by implication." The
Exchange argued that if an action by it was within the general scope of
the authority conferred upon exchanges by the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, then the delegation of authority by Congress which flowed •
through the SEC to the Exchange was a sufficient instance of pervasive
regulation by the government to preclude the application of the anti-
trust laws." Silver, then, presented the problems which occur when a
regulatory scheme dealing with securities exchanges meets another reg-
ulatory scheme dealing with antitrust violations.
The Supreme Court did not accept the theory that the operation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 precluded application of the anti-
trust laws by implication. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was said
to be "only the beginning, not the end, of inquiry," 38 and the Court
went on to suggest that an extended analysis of the regulatory scheme
was part of the "test" which it envisioned for the application of anti-
trust principles to the securities industry." It then articulated the es-
sence of that test when it said that immunity will result in instances
where the activities attacked on antitrust grounds are necessary to make
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 work." The Court advocated a
standard that reconciled the workings of both the regulatory scheme
and the antitrust statutes without ousting either."
81 373 U.S. at 343-44.
85 15 U.S.C.	 1-7 (1970).
86 373 U.S. at 346-47.
37 Id. at 347.
as Id. at 349.
86 Id. at 357.
40 cd[E]xchange self-regulation is to be regarded as justified in response to antitrust
charges only to the extent necessary to protect the achievement of the aims of the
Securities Exchange Act ...." Id. at 361, Cf. United States v. Morgan, 118 F, Supp. 621,
687 (S.DN.Y. 1953).
11 373 U.S. at 357.
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However, the Court did not undertake the "extended analysis" of
the regulatory scheme in question, nor did it resolve the issue of whether
violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts arose from the Exchange's
refusal to allow plaintiff continued access to its wires. 42
 Instead, it seized
on the claim of deprivation of due process which was implicit in the Ex-
change's refusal to notify the nonmember securities dealer of the rea-
sons for the deprivation of wire services and found the Exchange liable
on that basis alone. Resting its decision on due process, and emphasizing
"fair procedure," "procedural safeguards" and the "requirement of no-
tice and hearing"' the Court never actually balanced the statutory pol-
icies of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Sherman and Clay-
ton Acts. It never determined whether the Exchange's conduct was
violative of antitrust principles or, if so, whether that conduct was im-
munized by its place in the regulatory scheme established under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' 4 Hence the Court's discussion of the
scope of antitrust immunity is dicta, and it is uncertain what outcome
would have resulted had Silver's standards of statutory reconciliation
been applied to the fact situation of the case.
Immediate disagreement arose concerning the meaning of Silver."
There are two possible readings of the test which the Supreme Court
articulated as the way in which to reconcile a legislative grant of self-
regulatory power with the antitrust laws. According to one interpreta-
tion, described below as the "narrow" reading, the mere presence of a
general statutory authorization of control by a governmental agency
such as the SEC over particular forms of conduct potentially raises bar-
riers, derived from primary jurisdiction and pervasive statutory regula-
tion, to judicial review of antitrust matters. Antitrust principles may be
considered only by the agency in this case, and judicial inquiry is limited
to appellate review of the administrative determinations. The second
42 Id. at 364-66.
43 Id. at 364 -65. Justice Stewart, in a dissenting opinion, noted: "Whether there
has been a violation of the antitrust laws depends not at all upon whether the defendants'
conduct was arbitrary." Id. at 370 (dissenting opinion).
" Id. at 365. The Court stated:
Since it is perfectly clear that the Exchange can offer no justification under the
Securities Exchange Act for its collective action in denying petitioners the private
wire connections without notice and an opportunity for hearing, and that the
Exchange has therefore violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 and is
thus liable to petitioners under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 15, 26, there is no occasion for us to pass upon the sufficiency of the reasons
which the Exchange later assigned for its action.
Id. The court went on to say that a failure by a private association such as the
Exchange to provide procedural safeguards will result in damage liability without
inquiry into the substantive basis of a petitioner's claim. Id. at 365 n.18.
45 See, e.g., Kaplan v. Lehman Brothers, 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 954 (1967), where the interpretation of Silver conflicts with that in Thill v. New
York Stock Exchange, 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
See also Note, Stock Exchange Anti-Rebate Rule Must Be Necessary to the Operation
of the Securities Exchange Act in Order to be Immune from the .Antitrust Laws, 71
Colum. L. Rev. 932, 934 (1971).
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or "broad" interpretation of Silver stresses statutory reconciliation be-
tween the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Sherman and Clay-
ton Acts. It would utilize judicial inquiry into the antitrust effects of
regulated activity and would insist that antitrust law be enforced except
in those instances when it is irreconcilable with the policies of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act. The second interpretation essentially is the applica-
tion of the traditional antitrust standard of the rule of reason in order
to impart a degree of flexibility in carrying out the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934." Before discussing the applicability of Silver to the NASD,
then, it is necessary to determine which of these two interpretations of
Silver is correct.
B. The Narrow Interpretation of Silver
The narrow reading of Silver was fueled by a footnote in the opin-
ion which suggested that courts would be estopped from determinations
of antitrust claims if there were direct SEC jurisdiction and subsequent
judicial review of the Exchange activity in question. 47 This narrow read-
ing of Silver considers that the need for judicial reconciliation of the
securities regulation statutes and the antitrust statutes occurs only in
those limited situations where the SEC does not have direct control over
the actions which originally bring the matter into court. If the SEC does
have the statutorily assigned right to oversee a particular activity by a
securities exchange, then, according to this restrictive reading of Silver,
there is no need for direct inquiry by the courts. A court should not con-
duct a de novo adjudication of any problems which the SEC has de-
cided; it should conduct only appellate reviews of agency determina-
tions. Two alternative justifications are advanced for this conclusion:
first, the SEC as an administrative agency is considered to have primary
jurisdiction over the whole matter;" second, there is an implied immu-
nity from the antitrust laws because the SEC's power to oversee the
area is a sign of a pervasive regulatory scheme employed by Congress.'
40
 Id. at 360. Justice Brandeis' statement of the rule of reason is contained in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business.. .. The history
of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This
is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation
or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret
facts and to predict consequences.
Id. at 238.
47 373 U.S. at 358 n.12.
48 See Comment, An Approach for Reconciling Antitrust Law and Securities Law:
The Antitrust Immunity of the Securities Industry Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. Rev.
260, 318-23 (1970).
4u See 71 Colum. L. Rev., supra note 45, at 934; 65 Nw. U.L. Rev., supra note 48,
at 312-18. Essentially, the pervasive regulatory concept means that where the govern-
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Primary jurisdiction is a mode of deferral by the courts to regulatory
agencies which occurs when statutes give agencies and courts powers
Which are overlapping." There are two situations in which courts will
defer to an agency. One is when there are technical questions involved
regarding which the agency's expertise is entitled to deference. The sec-
ond is when Congress has delegated authority regarding the matter to
an agency as part of a pervasive regulatory scheme." Thus the concept
of a pervasive regulatory scheme has been utilized both as a supportive
underpinning for the primary jurisdiction rationale and as an indepen-
dent rationale itself for the narrow interpretation of Silver. Used in the
latter context, the concept is interpreted to mean that where a pervasive
regulatory scheme exists, courts have no power to intervene in matters
between an agency and the regulated entity. Rather, the regulating
agency may have the discretion to weigh antitrust considerations, though
such deliberations may not be specifically mandated by the statute con-
cerned. These two rationales would in effect shield exchange practices
from direct judicial inquiry into any antitrust implications of those
practices.
The narrow interpretation of Silver was adopted by the Seventh
Circuit in Kaplan v. Lehman Brothers," where the plaintiffs attacked
the minimum commission rates fixed by the stock exchange as an anti-
trust violation." The Seventh Circuit ruled that the exchange activity
involved was protected from the sweep of antitrust law because the SEC
was supposed to oversee such activities, and hence a pervasive regula-
tory situation was present." On the ground that the SEC had authority
to oversee an area, then, the court determined that there could be no
per se antitrust violations.
It is submitted, however, that administrative law decisions subse-
quent to Silver vitiate its narrow interpretation. These decisions attack
the concepts of primary jurisdiction and pervasive regulation as block-
ing antitrust determinations by courts. Two post-Silver Supreme Court
decisions regarding bank mergers which had been approved by the
Comptroller of Currency suggest that the expertise of a particular agency
may not justify judicial deference on grounds of primary jurisdiction if
antitrust claims are involved. In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank," the Court defined primary jurisdiction as the point at which
mental regulatory agency has power to review and direct the private parties involved,
antitrust immunity may have been implied by Congress. Since the actual fact situation
of Silver precludes any active SEC sanction against the New York Stock Exchange with
regard to the enforcement of a stock exchange rule—section 19(b) limits SEC power
over exchanges to change or supplement exchange rules rather than review of the
enforcement or application of a rule—the question of a pervasive regulatory scheme
arguably is never reached.
55 See Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 Ham L. Rev. 1037, 1040-41 (1964).
51 65 Nw. U.L. Rev., supra note 48, at 319.
52 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 954 (1967).
63 Id. at 410.
64 Id. Cf. 65 Nw. U.L. Rev., supra note 48, at 302, 308-09, 311,
55 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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judicial abstention occurred in order to protect the integrity of the reg-
ulatory scheme." The Philadelphia Nat'l Bank case involved the Bank
Merger Act of 1960" and the attempted merger of two Philadelphia
banks which had previously been approved by the Comptroller of Cur-
rency. The Bank Merger Act of 1960 did not indicate whether the
Comptroller was to give any particular weight to potential anticompeti-
tive effects resulting from a merger but did indicate that he was to seek
the opinion of the Department of Justice and the Federal Reserve Bank
as to the desirability of any merger in terms of potential antitrust prob-
lems. The Court stated that the Comptroller of Currency was not bound
by these opinions." The Court rejected the argument that because the
Comptroller was directed to consider anticompetitive factors before ap-
proving mergers, those mergers were immunized from antitrust chal-
lenges. The Court called such immunity "implied" and suggested that
implied antitrust immunity was not favored;" in any case, it did not
justify judicial abstention here on grounds of primary jurisdiction. Any
narrowing of the courts' powers must therefore arise from a provision
in an agency's enabling statute authorizing the agency to grant antitrust
immunity rather than from an innate agency expertise." In United
States v. First City Nat'l Bank'''. the Supreme Court disallowed two
bank mergers which had been approved by the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency according to the standards of the Bank Merger Act of 1966; 02 the
1966 Act provided that the Comptroller should weigh the prospective
benefits and the anticompetitive features in a proposed merger after
receiving recommendations from the Federal Deposit Insurance Agency,
the Federal Reserve Board and the Department of Justice." The Court
based its rejection on the grounds that the agency review conferred by
the statute did not carry great weight with regard to the antitrust con-
sequences of the merger. The antitrust area was one in which the courts
had particular experience in determining the extent to which antitrust
policy should apply: "traditionally in antitrust actions involving regu-
lated industries, the courts have never given presumptive weight to a
prior agency decision, for the simple reason that Congress put such
suits on a different axis than was familiar in administrative procedure.""
The Court went on to observe that the "momentum of judicial prece-
dents" was moving in the direction of allowing the courts to handle anti-
trust problems which arose in the context of regulatory environments."
It is reasonable to assume that the Supreme Court's interpretation
6° Id. at 353.
67
 Bank Merger Act, 74 Stat. 129 (1960), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1970).
68 374 U.S. at 351.
50 Id. at 348, 350.
60
 Id. at 354.
61 386 U.S. 361 (1967).
62
 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1970).
03 386 U.S. at 363.
64 Id. at 367.
05 Id. at 368.
119
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
of the primary jurisdiction problems in the bank merger and antitrust
area suggests that absent an explicit antitrust repealer, the courts rather
than administrative agencies are the proper medium for the resolution
of antitrust questions even where the agencies have primary jurisdic-
tion. Hence it would appear that a narrow reading of Silver, removing
exchange activities from judicial scrutiny of their anticompetitive effect
on the ground that the SEC has primary jurisdiction over those activ-
ities, should fail in light of the bank merger cases.
The pervasive regulatory scheme rationale which has been used to
support a narrow reading of the Silver dicta" appears to be no sounder
than the primary jurisdiction rationale. A pervasive regulatory scheme
which is capable of shielding the regulated activities from antitrust laws
is one wherein the agency participates in the decisions of the industry
and directs the route of its basic philosphy and choices." An example
of participation by an agency in an industry is that of the relationship
between the Interstate Commerce Commission and the various trans-
portation groups." Where monitoring and participation by the agency
are so close, it is agreed, antitrust exemption may be implied, even if no
express repealer of the antitrust laws is contained in the statute.
No Supreme Court cases in the securities area which would rebut
or limit this argument have been decided. However, the Court has dis-
cussed the concept of a pervasive regulatory scheme with regard to other
areas of administrative law and, in the decisions handed down after
Silver, discussed above, has clarified the scope of this standard. An
examination of the rationale of the following decisions will help to
determine whether or not the pervasive regulatory scheme test used
in the narrow interpretation of Silver is sound.
In United States v. RCA" the Supreme Court found immunity
from antitrust charges on the ground of a generalized rate structure that
constituted a pervasive regulatory scheme. The reason given was that
sporadic action by federal courts could disturb this delicate rate struc-
ture and defeat its very purpose." If there is no pervasive regulatory
scheme, it does not matter whether or not the agency controlling the
industry has ruled that there is an antitrust violation." The holding in
California v. FPC 72
 clarified the implications of the RCA decision. The
Supreme Court stated in California v. FPC that even if there is a perva-
66 See generally 71 Colum. L. Rev., supra note 45.
67
 65 Nw. U.L. Rev., supra note 48, at 339. See Hale & Hale, Competition or
Control VI: Application of Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev.
46, 53-56 (1962). This article points out that industries with highly pervasive regulatory
schemes tend to have originated as natural monopolies which could not function properly
without a high degree of government intervention. -
68 49 U.S.C. $¢ 5(11), 5b (1970). See also Comment, NYSE Rules and the Antitrust
Laws—Rule 394—Necessary Restriction or Illegal Refusal to Deal? 45 St. John's L. Rev.
812 (1971).
66 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
70 Id. at 350.
71 Id. at 351. See Note, 1970 U. Ill. L. F. 544, 550.
72 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
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sive regulatory scheme, but no express power on the part of the agency
to immunize, the courts still have the power to decide the antitrust as-
pects of the case, although they may have to defer to the agency regard-
ing all other aspects in issue.' Courts should not defer to agencies which
have pervasive regulatory powers in an area if these pervasive powers
do not include the authority to consider antitrust matters, despite the
fact that the agency may have used antitrust criteria in its decisions."
The Court said that it was not deciding how conflicting legislative pol-
icies should be accommodated, but said that "Our function is to see
that the policy entrusted to the courts is not frustrated by an adminis-
trative agency." 75
It is submitted, then, that neither of the rationales advanced in
support of a narrow interpretation of Silver is tenable. The bank merger
cases suggest that even if the SEC had control over the actions in ques-
tion in the Silver case, such control would have provided neither pri-
mary jurisdiction nor a pervasive regulatory scheme. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank suggests that even when a statute gives to the agency supervising
the industry standards by which to judge antitrust implications, courts
can review the antitrust issues unless a specific repealer has been
enacted." Thus the fact that Congress has given power to a specific
agency concerning particular regulatory areas does not eliminate con-
sideration by federal courts of antitrust problems in those areas. Perva-
siveness is seen to be a determinative factor only in limited circumstances
such as those in United States v. RCA, where regulatory agencies are
empowered to set up technical rate systems whose balance might be im-
paired by court decisions. The Supreme Court accepted neither theories
of primary jurisdiction nor congressional authorization of agencies to
oversee particular activities as sufficient reasons to block judicial inter-
vention over antitrust matters.
C. The Broad Interpretation of Silver
The second or broad reading of Silver is that the decision sets forth
what has been called a "repugnancy test,"" i.e., that it demands recon-
78
 Id. at 487.
74
 Id. at 488-90.
75
 Id. at 490. But see Pan American World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S.
296 (1963). The Pan American situation is the one in which the courts hesitate to use
their antitrust expertise. Under the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. H 1301 et seq.
(1970), the Civil Aeronautics Board uses a special standard of the "public interest" defined
by Congress for use in its determinations regarding air travel. The Supreme Court felt
that this special grant of power to the CAB created a pervasive regulatory situation in
this case since "if the courts were to intrude independently with their construction of the
antitrust laws, two regimes might collide." 371 U.S. at 310. The Court thus found that
the CAB was the proper body to apply antitrust standards in the case.
75 374 U.S. at 321. The Bank Merger Amendment of 1966 causes problems because
it provides for the standards called for in Philadelphia Nat'l Bank but also provides
for federal court trial de novo on antitrust claims. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (7) (A) (1970).
77 Johnson, Application of Antitrust Laws to the Securities Industry, 20 Sw. L.J.
536, 553 (1966).
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ciliation between the antitrust laws and other legislation governing a
given activity and prohibits application of the former only when such
application would make the statutory goals of the latter unattainable.
Therefore, in the absence of an express antitrust repealer, recovery on
an antitrust claim will be granted if plaintiff can show that there is an
antitrust violation by activities which are not necessary to make the reg-
ulatory scheme work. Two questions must be answered in applying the
repugnancy test: is the practice in issue necessary to preserve the partic-
ular regulatory characteristics of the statute in question; and, if the
practice is not necessary to preserve the regulatory character, what anti-
trust standard is to be used—a reasonableness standard or a per se
violation—in determining liability and balancing the two statutory
schemes."
The problem with the repugnancy test, as was illustrated in Thill
v. New York Stock Exchange," a Seventh Circuit decision which in
effect reversed Kaplan v. Lehman Bros.,8° is that reconciliation of two
statutory schemes with an eye toward the preeminence of the regulatory
scheme has a practical effect much like primary jurisdiction or perva-
siveness if the regulatory statute is deemed to control 8 1 In Kaplan the
Seventh Circuit had ruled that if arguably anticompetitive conduct was
subject to review by the SEC, it could not be reviewed by the court.
Apparently taking notice of a stinging dissent to the decision to deny
certiorari in the Kaplan case," the Seventh Circuit suggested in Thill
that the correct reading of the Silver standard lay in the broad view or
reconciliation of the statutes." Distinguishing Kaplan by stating that
the plaintiff in that case had made the mistake of arguing that the mini-
mum commission rates violated a per se antitrust standard rather than
urging that the court apply a rule of reason test," the court in Thill
ruled that SEC supervision itself could not cloak the stock exhanges in
antitrust immunity unless this immunity had been specifically conferred
by the language of the regulatory statute; in so ruling the court relied
upon the Supreme Court's insistence that antitrust immunity usually is
not implied."
78
 The Court in Silver noted that this question had to be answered in applying the
antitrust immunity standards it had set forth in dicta, but found it unnecessary to
resolve the question since the decision was based on other grounds. The Court stated:
Thus there is also no need for us to define further whether the interposing of a
substantive justification in an antitrust suit brought to challenge a particular
enforcement of the rules on its merits is to be governed by a standard of
arbitrariness, good faith, reasonableness or some other measure.
373 U.S. at 365-66.
TO 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970).
88 See discussion at notes 52-54 supra.
81
 Cf. 433 F.2d at 269-71.
82 389 U.S. at 957 (Warren, C.J., dissenting): "In my view, this blunderbuss
approach falls far short of the close analysis and delicate weighing process mandated by
this COurt's opinion in Silver."
88
 433 F.2d at 269-71.
84 Id. at 270.
85
 Id. at 269. See United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967);
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It is submitted that Thill's interpretation of Silver is correct. The
holdings of the administrative cases discussed above regarding federal
courts' jurisdiction over antitrust matters suggest that the narrow read-
ing of Silver is unacceptable. It is unacceptable because it employs a
mechanical standard in finding antitrust immunity if an administrative
agency has any jurisdiction whatsoever, whether specifically granted by
Congress or implied through the extent of the actual power of the agency.
The Seventh Circuit rejected that standard in Thill when it in effect re-
versed the original narrow reading of Silver that it had set forth in Kap-
lan. The court stated that "a reconciliation of the two statutory schemes
[antitrust and the Securities Exchange Act] is not foreclosed simply
because the Securities Act and the review jurisdiction of the SEC may
touch upon the activity challenged under the antitrust laws."" It is con-
cluded, then, that the broad interpretation is the proper analysis of the
principles set forth in Silver. Moreover, the broad reading of Silver is
consistent with the outcome of Silver itself.
D. Silver Analyzed Under the Broad Interpretation
The problem in analyzing the holding in Silver is that the Court
laid down its standards in dicta and then decided the case on notions of
due process, leaving courts in subsequent cases to grapple with the scope
of the standards set forth. It will be helpful, for purposes of analysis and
for later application of the proper interpretation of Silver to the NASD
activities in Harwell, to backtrack and consider the facts of Silver in
light of the broad reading of the case. The standard would demand an
inquiry as to whether the activities challenged in Silver were reasonably
related to the goals of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The inquiry
should start with the reasons for the passage of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, an examination that will also provide a useful framework
for a later comparison of that Act with the Maloney Act in the context
of Harwell. The question to be considered in examining the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 concerns the scope of supervisory authority over
the stock exchanges' self-regulation given to the SEC by the Act. It has
been suggested that the terms of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
are vague as to the supervisory duties of the SEC.87 It appears, then,
that the SEC is relatively free to choose its special areas of regulatory
concern under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains many implementation
provisions which give the SEC specific powers over securities ex-
changes." However, it is clear from the fact of the Act, as the Court in
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 327, 348 (1963); California v.
PPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962).
843 433 F.2d at 269.
87 See Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public, 22
Stan. L. Rev. 675, 689-90 (1970).
BB 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1970) provides for the registration of national securities ex-
changes. The registration statement must contain information which includes an agree-
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Silver observed," that there is no specific power on the part of the SEC
to review applications of stock exchange rules by the exchanges them-
selves. There is no mention of antitrust in the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. Moreover, there are no standards in the Act which could be
used to guide SEC deliberations concerning antitrust problems except
for an admonition that the Act is intended "to insure fair dealing in
securities traded in upon such exchange . . . ."" Although the SEC is
free to consider the anticompetitive impact of exchange rules, the
language of the statute makes it clear that there is no statutory duty
imposed on the SEC to evaluate the antitrust aspects of exchange
rulings." The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains no specific
repealer of the antitrust laws as do some other regulatory statutes." The
legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 suggests that
Congress did not consider antitrust problems in its scheme." Congress
was concerned with enacting a measure to control speculation and
manipulation on the stock exchanges in order to protect the investor."
ment to comply with and enforce the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and any rules which the SEC makes under the provisions of the Act. 15 U.S.C.
78f(a)(1), (2) (1970). Each exchange which files a registration statement is further
obliged to provide the SEC with copies of any amendments to its rules. 15 U.S.C.
* 78f(a)(4) (1970).
The SEC can directly prescribe rules with regard to the securities exchanges concern-
ing their regulation of floor trading by members for their own account or discretionary
accounts. The SEC can also prescribe rules to prevent excessive trading on the exchange
but off the floor. 15 U.S.C. § 78k(a) (1970).
Section 78s is the basic mechanism for supervision of exchange practices. The SEC
is authorized by § 78s(a)(1) to withdraw the registration of a national securities
exchange if the exchange has failed to enforce compliance by members with the
provisions included in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC is also authorized
to suspend the trading in any registered security for ten days or, with the approval of
the President, to suspend trading on a national securities exchange for not more than
ninety days. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(4) (1970). Section 78s(b) authorizes the SEC to alter
or supplement the rules of an exchange in order to encourage the protection of investors
in certain specifically delimited areas. Section 78s gives the SEC power to alter the
rules of exchanges but does not give the SEC any particular review powers of exchange
actions. Furthermore, Section 78s(a)(1) permits the SEC to discipline an exchange only
when the exchange itself is violating rules enacted in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. The same section permits the SEC to discipline an exchange when there is a
failure to enforce compliance with rules by a member of the exchange.
89 '373 U.S. at 357. See Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The
Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 Law & Contemp. Prob. 663, 680
(1964).
00
 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970).
01 65 Nw. U.L. Rev., supra note 48, at 285.
02 Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970) (exemption for state regulation of insurance);
15 U.S.C. I 17 (1970) (exemption of labor unions from antitrust); 15 U.S.C. 4 45(a)(3)
(1970) (exemption. of resale of commodities from antitrust); 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1970)
(exemption of export trade associations).
°a See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1934); S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934); H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. Doc. No. 185, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1934); H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
94 See, e.g., Tracy & MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 Mich.
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Hence an apparent lack of congressional consideration of the role of
antitrust in the regulatory scheme would seem to invite the applica-
tion of antitrust standards by the courts.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is a regulatory scheme, and
admitted and anticompetitive effects accompany every regulatory
scheme." However, the question which a court adopting either the broad
or the narrow Silver standard should apply to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 is how pervasive and all-encompassing is the regulatory
scheme.
It seems apparent that, had the Silver case not been decided on the
basis of the denial of due process, the Court would have held that the
SEC was not sufficiently involved with statutory standards of antitrust
to warrant finding an immunity from antitrust. Since the denial of the
private wires to the nonmember broker-dealer in Silver was tantamount
to a refusal to deal, and no conceivable statutorily protected objective
was thereby protected, it is concluded that the activity of the New York
Stock Exchange which had come under scrutiny was vulnerable to the
antitrust claims.
II. THE APPLICABILITY OF STOCK EXCHANGE ANTITRUST
IMMUNITY STANDARDS TO THE NASD
The issues raised in Silver concerning antitrust violations and legis-
lative and administrative regulatory policy were raised in the context of
the Maloney Act and the NASD's regulation of its member brokers and
dealers by the principal case considered in this comment, Harwell v.
Growth Programs, Inc. Both the district court and the appellate de-
cisions alluded to Silver, applying to the NASD the antitrust standards
that the Supreme Court had applied to the stock exchanges; each, how-
ever, appeared to adopt a different interpretation of Silver.
The district court in Harwell apparently viewed the Silver standard
as a variation of the narrow reading discussed above. The court felt that
if it interfered on antitrust grounds with the rulemaking powers of the
NASD, especially in this situation where the SEC had concurred in the
establishment of the challenged NASD interpretation, a serious dis-
ruption of the statutory scheme of self-regulation established by the
Maloney Act would occur. The district court stated that when "the
NASD is acting in the quasi-governmental rulemaking capacity given to
it by the Maloney Act, and is acting under the close supervision of the
SEC, it is immune from antitrust suits!'" The court further pointed to
Section 78o-3 (n) of the Maloney Act as a possible repealer of the anti-
trust laws." Essentially, then, the district court followed the Kaplan
L. Rev. 1025, 1025-33 (1934); Baxter, supra note 87, at 685; 45 St. John's L. Rev.,
supra note 68, at 842 n.129.
95
 Nerenberg, Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to the Securities Field, 16 W.
Res. L. Rev. 131, 134 (1964).
96 315 F. Supp. at 1191.
97
 Id. See text at notes 117-125 infra for a discussion of section 78o-3(n).
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interpretation of Silver—if the groups involved were functioning under
the aegis of statutory authority, they were immune from antitrust lia-
bility.
The court of appeals in Harwell, on the other hand, used the broad
interpretation of Silver in its analysis of the antitrust problems in the
case. The court observed:
Implicit in the judgment of the whole court in Silver, major-
ity, concurring and dissenting, is the basic concept that the
Securities Act prevails over the antitrust acts, when the
provisions of the two are in conflict . . . . [T] he Maloney Act
"prevails" over any other laws of the United States only to the
extent that they conflict. To determine if they conflict, the
Maloney Act should be construed to reach only those things
necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act."
The problem as the court saw it was whether the "repealer" section of
the Maloney Act was indeed an antitrust repealer. However, the court
was uncertain whether, if it actually were a repealer, it could justifiably
be read to reach all activity which the NASD carried out under the
Maloney Act."
It has already been submitted that the broad interpretation of Sil-
ver is the correct interpretation. However, the question arises whether
the Silver standard can properly be applied to the problem in Harwell
at all—that is, to the Maloney Act and the NASD. It is submitted that it
can. The history and terms of the Maloney Act show that it was in-
-tended by Congress to establish for the over-the-counter market the
same kind of regulatory scheme earlier established by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 for the securities exchanges. One provision in
the Maloney Act could be interpreted as providing express immunity
from antitrust law, but, as will herein be shown, convincing arguments
militate against such a view.
The Maloney Act was passed in 1938 as a response to the inade-
quate provision for the over-the-counter market in the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, which gave to the SEC few powers regarding the
over-the-counter market. The SEC bad at best general powers over
fraudulent dealing in this area,'" arising from the registration pro-
visions of the Act.101
 A private investment bankers' association had
devised a code for the over-the-counter industry under the auspices of
98 451 F.2d at 247.
99
 Id. at 246.
100
 See Note, the NASD—An Unique Experiment in Cooperative Regulation, 46
Va. L. Rev. 1586 (1960); Westwood & Howard, Self-Government in the Securities
Business, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 518, 526 (1952).
101
 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1970). The registration provisions were applicable to the many
over-the-counter dealers who were also members of the New York Stock Exchange.
See, e.g., Frey, Federal Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Securities Market, 106
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 43 (1957).
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the National Industrial Recovery Act.'" However, this code was vitiated
by the effects of the ruling that rendered the NIRA unconstitutional in
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 103
 and in any case it
was not an effective instrument for enforcement since there remained
areas where abuses in the over-the-counter market could occur. Most of
these abuses, not prohibited by the code, would not be technical viola-
tions of any law, but would be considered instances of unfair dealing
by the securities industry.'" In 1938, then, the SEC and the private
association collaborated and sponsored the Maloney Act, which pro-
vided for what Senator Maloney, its Senate sponsor, termed "coopera-
tive regulation."'"
The Maloney Act provides for the registration of any association
of brokers or dealers with the SEC as a national securities association.'"
As in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, copies of the constitution and
all rules of the association are to be supplied to the SEC.'" The rules of
any such national securities association must provide that any broker
who comes under the geographical qualifications for membership
established by the rules of the association be admitted as a member of
the association unless he fails to meet the standards provided in the
Maloney Act.'" The Act obviously envisioned the creation of several
associations, each in a different geographical area, rather than the one
large association, the NASD, which ultimately resulted.'"
The Act requires that the rules of a brokers' and dealers' association
registered with the SEC assure fair representation of members regarding
the adoption of any rule or amendment; be designed to prevent fraudu-
lent and manipulative acts and practices; provide that its members be
appropriately disciplined for rule violations; and have a fair and
orderly procedure with respect to the disciplining of members."' The
SEC is authorized to review disciplinary actions against members or
denials of admission to the association upon its own motions"' and to
overrule actions by the association."' The SEC may abrogate any rule
of an association in order "to assure fair dealing by the members of
such association, to assure a fair representation of its members in the
administration of its affairs or otherwise to protect investors or ef-
fectuate the purposes of this chapter.""3 Furthermore, the SEC may
102
 46 Va. L. Rev., supra note 100, at 1586-89; Frey, supra note 101, at 43.
I" 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
104
 46 Va. L. Rev., supra note 100, at 1587; Comment, Over-the-Counter Trading
and the Maloney Act, 48 Yale L.J. 633, 644-46 (1939).
"5 46 Va. L. Rev., supra note 100, at 1587 n.9; 83 Cong. Rec. 4451 (1948) (re-
marks of Sen. Maloney).
100 15 U.S .C. § 780-3(a) (1970).
I" 15 U.S .C. § 78o-3(a) (2) (1970).
108 15 U.S .C. § 78o-3(b) (1970).
209 See 48 Yale L.J., supra note 104, at 646-48.
110
 15 U.S .C. §§ 78o-3(b) (6), (8)-(10) (1970).
111 15 U.S .C. § 78o-3(g) (1970).
112 15 U.S .C. 11 78o-3(h)(1)-(3) (1970).
113
 15 U.S .C.	 78o-3(k)(1) (1970).
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request the association to adopt specified alterations or supplements to
its rules with respect to denials of membership, methods of adoption of
rules changes, method of choosing officers and directors and the affiliation
between registered securities associations."' Essentially, then, much of
the Maloney Act is similar to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
although it is tailored to the functioning of a far less structured branch
of the securities industry, the over-the-counter market.
However, there are certain provisions in the Maloney Act which
reveal differences between it and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and which create doubts about the applicability to the over-the-counter
market of the Silver standard which was developed with reference to the
stock exchanges under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. One sig-
nificant distinCtion arises from Section 78o-3(i) (1) of the Maloney
Act. It provides:
The rules of a registered securities association may pro-
vide that no member thereof shall deal with any nonmember
broker or dealer . . . except at the same prices, for the same
commissions or fees, and on the same terms and conditions as
are by such member accorded to the public."'
Subsection (3) further provides:
Nothing in this subsection shall be so construed or applied as
to prevent any member of a registered securities association
from granting to any other member of any registered securities
association any dealer's discount, allowance, commission or
special terms."'
This provision, analogous to the limited membership provision pertinent
to securities exchanges which makes it so important that a broker-dealer
retain his membership in an exchange, is the one which puts teeth into
all the other provisions of the Maloney Act. If a broker-dealer cannot
obtain a discount when trading over-the-counter, he in effect takes a loss
on the transaction unless he can bill the customer for it. He cannot do
that, however, if he wishes to remain competitive with other broker-
dealers who are not charging a higher fee. Hence a strong inducement
arises to join the NASD in order to obtain the member's discount.
The Maloney Act ends with a provision which has been interpreted
as a "repealer" against the antitrust laws and which can be read in
conjunction with the discriminatory discount provision in section 78o-
3 (i). Section 78o-3 (n) reads:
If any provision of this section is in conflict with any law of
the United States in force on June 25, 1938, the provision of
this section shall prevail.
114 15 U.S.C.§§ 78o-3(k)(2)(A)-(D) (1970).
115 15 U.S.C.	 78o-3(i)(1) (1970).
116 15 U.S.C. 9 78o-3(i)(3) (1970).
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This "repealer" is the major feature distinguishing the Maloney
Act from the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulat-
ing stock exchanges. The specific grant of authority to the SEC to review
disciplinary actions taken by any over-the-counter securities associa-
tion which registers is also a significant difference.'
Notwithstanding the differences between the Maloney Act and the
Securities Exchange Act, the former was not intended to differ signifi-
cantly from the regulatory scheme set up for the securities exchanges 118
Senator Maloney, speaking before the Senate, stated that "the bill does
not propose anything radical in the investment banking field. It does
for that business about what was done for the exchanges through the
Securities Exchange Act.""°
One striking difference between the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the Maloney Act does, however, stand out: the "repealer"
clause of the Maloney Act. If Section 78o-3 (n) is a total repealer of all
conflicting laws, including the antitrust laws, then the consideration
and acquiescence of the SEC is sufficient to immunize the NASD in the
Harwell case as well as in other antitrust situations arising under the
Maloney Act. But if section 78o-3 (n) is not a blanket repealer, then the
question of antitrust exemption or applicability should be answered in
terms of the standards established in Silver—and the proper standards
to be employed, it has been submitted, are those discerned in the broad
interpretation.
Section 78o-3 (n) may indeed be interpreted as a grant of antitrust
immunity to the over-the-counter securities dealers in the regulation
of their industry. It has been interpreted by various commentators as
providing an antitrust exemption for the Maloney Act and the NASD
And the SEC.'" Justice Frankfurter suggested in a dissent in Interna-
117 Other differences include the power of the SEC to alter rules, the emergence of
only one organization to be regulated, and the technical jurisdiction of the SEC over
most action and rules of the NASD, something which the SEC does not have with
respect to the exchanges. See Jennings, supra note 89, at 676; Hed-Hofmann
'
 The
Maloney Act Experiment, 6 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 187, 205 (1965). It could be
argued that the latter provision creates a primary jurisdiction situation that, under the
narrow interpretation of Silver, would justify a decision that antitrust problems arising
within that area of primary jurisdiction must be dealt with by the SEC, not the courts.
However, neither the Maloney Act nor the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes any
mention of guidelines for antitrust determination to be used by the SEC in overseeing
the respective organizations. This absence of guidelines creates a situation which is the
opposite of that in the Pan American Airways case, note 75 supra, and similar to the
situation in California v. FPC. Therefore, the situation is arguably one in which the
courts would not have to defer to the agency even under the narrow interpretation of
the Silver decision.
118 See generally, White, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 28 Geo.
Wash, L. Rev. 250 (1959); irey, note 101 supra; 83 Cong. Rec. 4451 (1938).
1" 83 Cong. Rec. 4451 (1938).
1" See, e.g., Nerenberg, supra note 95, at 140; Sterling, Stockbrokers Going Public:
Antitrust Aspects of Exchange Rules, 13 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 563, 571 (1966); Note, Stock
Exchange Immunity from the Antitrust Laws, 51 B.U. L. Rev. 32, 34 n.14, 43 n.101
(1971); Comment, Informal Bargaining Process: An Analysis of the SEC's Regulation
of the New York Stock Exchange, 80 Yale L.J. 811, 818 n.49 (1971).
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tional Ass'n of Machinists v. Street that section 78o -3 (n) created an
antitrust exemption,' and Justice Douglas made the same suggestion
in dicta in United States v. Socony -Vacuum Oil Co.' One federal
district court came to a similar conclusion in United States v. Morgan.123
On the other hand, it has been pointed out that both the Maloney
Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 specifically authorize
practices which could be interpreted as per se antitrust violations.' In
the case of the Maloney Act, it is the authorization of discounts and
concessions to be given only to fellow members of associations and
denied to nonmembers. The discount provisions in the Maloney Act
supply what private self-regulatory attempts had been unable to do:
force members to join the regulatory association or to suffer economic
discrimination in the placing of their orders.'"
Previous decisions have shown that a private group's efforts to
enforce regulatory sanctions by showing discriminatory behavior to
those outside the group who would not join the private group are vul-
nerable to state and federal antitrust law."° These cases suggest that
without direct congressional protection from antitrust law of the dis-
count provisions which the NASD uses as an inducement for member-
ship, that type of inducement would constitute an antitrust violation.
They suggest that if Congress did not in some way immunize the actions
of the brokers' and dealers' association under the regulatory statute,
the enforced discount situation would have violated antitrust laws. 127
In a 1945 SEC case, one of the commissioners commented on the
meaning of section 78o-3 (n). He maintained that the section was to be
read in conjunction with section 78o-3 (i) (1), authorizing discounts, on
the grounds that it would preclude antitrust claims based on the anti-
competitive tendencies of that one
 section of the Maloney Act.328 A final
121
 367 U.S. 740, 809-10 n.16 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
122 310 U.S. 150, 227 n.60 (1940).
123
 118 F. Supp. 621, 686-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The court stated:
If Congress engaged in the elimination of harmful practices . . . passed a series
of statutes into the terms of which the established procedures of investment
bankers ... have been inextricably interwoven, thus indicating that the members
of the Congress were implementing the operation of a system which they
regarded as generally legal and proper, what weight should a court give to such
attitude on the part of the Congress, in determining whether or not the
practices thus implemented are violations of the Sherman Act, in view of the
circumstance that no general exemption from the provisions of the Sherman
Act is set forth in such legislation?
Id. at 686.
124 Cf. Westwood & Howard, supra note 100, at 528 n.67.
125
 48 Yale L.J., supra note 104, at 646-47.
126 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, 13 F.2d 673, 687 (8th Cir. 1926). The
rules of a grain exchange calling for its members to deal with nonmembers on a dis-
criminatory basis were deemed unfair competition since they tended toward monopoly.
See also 48 Yale L.J., supra note 104, at 645-46.
127
 Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets:
Implied Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 Cornell L.Q. 633, 637 (1966); Westwood
& Howard, supra note 100, at 528 n.67.
128 Nat'l Assin of Securities Dealers, Inc., 19 S.E.C. 424, 478 n.9 (1945). The Com-
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argument that section 78o-3 (n) is not a sweeping repealer arises from
its imprecise language when compared with the explicit language of other
sweeping antitrust repealers that the Congress has enacted into law.' 29
It is concluded, then, that section 78o-3 (1) is vulnerable to antitrust
attack and that section 78o-3 (n) was enacted in order to confer im-
munity upon that section only.
Assuming the "repealer" in the Maloney Act only applies to sec-
tion 78o-3 (i), then the differences between the Maloney Act and the
exchange regulatory provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
are minimal. Accordingly it is submitted that this similarity between the
two securities regulatory schemes justifies applying the standard de-
veloped by Silver to cases arising under the Maloney Act as well as to
those involving the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. It has been sub-
mitted that the broad interpretation of Silver is the correct one. Ac-
cordingly the standards of the "repugnancy" test to which that interpre-
tation gives rise should be applied to the facts of Harwell.
III. APPLICATION OF THE BROAD INTERPRETATION OF
Silver TO Harwell
The broad or "repugnancy" standard of Silver is a test which
first inquires whether an alleged antitrust activity is essential to the
purposes of the regulatory act in question. Only if an activity is not
essential will the court go on to determine whether there is an antitrust
violation. Therefore, in the context of Harwell, the first determination
which must be made is whether the NASD activity which was attacked
by plaintiffs is essential and necessary to the workings and purpose of
the Maloney Act.
The in-and-out short swing activity which the single investment
plan holders were indulging in under the terms of their contract plans
presents a question of fact as to whether this sort of trading situation
is speculative or manipulative within the terms of the Maloney Act. If
the in-and-out activity is within the speculative activity which the
Maloney Act attempted to control, then the NASD interpretation of
the rules of fair practice to eliminate this new device of speculation is
necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Act. It would appear that
the in-and-out trading on the basis of the contract plans constituted a
classic speculative situation where the traders had an advantage over
others in the same market. Because of their knowledge of the future net
asset value, the position of the single investment plan owners was com-
parable to that of persons possessing inside information who trade on a
securities exchange. Their ability to move in and out of the fund without
missioner noted that he "never knew of any other [meaning] and never heard of any
other while the Maloney Act was pending before Congress and was the subject of daily
reports and discussions inside the Commission."
122 See, e.g., Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970); Interstate Commerce
Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 5(11), 5b(9) (1970); Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970); Webb-
Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. 62 (1970); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
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paying commissions also gave them an unfair advantage over traders
who were not single investment plan owners.
If the actions of a regulatory body are necessary to uphold the
policies of a regulatory statute, the repugnancy test advocated by the
broad interpretation of Silver provides an absolute antitrust defense. It
is submitted that the investors' speculative activities in Harwell are
activities that the regulatory scheme established by the Maloney Act is
directly intended to regulate. Accordingly, it would appear that, under
the broad view of Silver, the NASD interpretation challenged in Harwell
should be immune from antitrust liability: the application of antitrust
law would create a result repugnant to the purposes of the Maloney
Act. Therefore, the absolute defense of the "repugnancy test" should
provide immunity against the antitrust claims of plaintiffs in Harwell.
If the facts of Harwell were different, and the activities of the plain-
tiffs were not so clearly speculative and directly violative of Maloney
Act policies, then the second tier of tests mandated by the broad inter-
pretation of Silver must be applied. The question becomes whether the
action taken by the NASD here is "essential and necessary" under the
terms of the Maloney Act. Here, again, if the rule or interpretation is
expressly mandated by the Maloney Act, no problem arises, since it is
necessary to the objectives of the Act. However, if there is no express
authorization of the rule or interpretation, or if the rule or interpretation
is for the purposes of administrative efficiency, the necessity of the
NASD action must be examined as well as the alternative actions open
to the NASD. That is to say, if the NASD has open to it several options
for correcting behavior that it considers undesirable, it is obligated to
choose the option which least curtails investors' rights.
Applying this reasoning to the Harwell situation, and assuming for
the sake of the argument that the in-and-out activity of the contract plan
holders had not been clearly speculative, it appears that the NASD
could have responded to the activity with alternative actions in addition
to the action that it did in fact take—the issuance of the interpretation.
One option would have been to change the method by which the net
asset value was calculated, a solution which would have left the contract
plans intact, but which would have effectively removed the basis upon
which any type of guaranteed speculation could operate. If, in such
a situation, the NASD did not choose the most reasonable method of
controlling an alleged abuse and thus the least violative of others' rights,
it would be vulnerable to antitrust claims.
CONCLUSION
The antitrust immunity conferred by the Maloney Act should be
judged by the standards applicable to the stock exchanges enunciated in
Silver. Although the decision in Silver was actually based upon the New
York Stock Exchange's denial of procedural due process, the Supreme
Court's broad interpretation of the scope of antitrust immunity of the
132
ANTITRUST IMMUNITY OF THE NASD
stock exchanges, set forth in dicta, is applicable to the NASD. The
conclusion that the broad interpretation of the unsettled meaning of
Silver is the correct reading of the case is supported by the fact that
the rationales for a narrow interpretation—i.e., concepts of primary
jurisdiction or pervasive regulatory power in a government agency—
have been vitiated by administrative law decisions made by the Supreme
Court subsequent to Silver. This broad interpretation of Silver requires
courts to attempt to reconcile the policies of the regulatory statute in
question with the antitrust laws; only where there is a direct conflict
should the policy of the regulatory statute be controlling and immunity
from antitrust law be accorded to the action of the regulatory agency.
The express repealer provision in the Maloney Act, Section 78o-
3 (n), is the key distinguishing feature between that Act and the ex-
change regulatory provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
However, this repealer does not grant blanket antitrust immunity to all
NASD activities, but is limited in application to the discriminatory
discount provisions in 78o-3(i). Thus, the NASD has no automatic
defense provided by 78o-3 (n) against antitrust claims such as those
brought by the plaintiffs in Harwell. Instead, under the broad inter-
pretation of Silver, the NASD must prove that its activities were neces-
sary and essential to the anti-speculative policies of the Maloney Act
in order that those activities be protected from antitrust liability. It is
submitted that the NASD interpretation challenged in Harwell is neces-
sary to accomplish the objectives of the Maloney Act. Therefore the
NASD was justified in adopting the interpretation and is not subject to
antitrust liability on the facts of the case. The Supreme Court should
uphold the Fifth Circuit's decision to remand the case to the district
court for a hearing on the merits. Ultimately, the district court should
dismiss plaintiffs' antitrust claims on the basis of the antitrust immunity
provided to defendants by the Maloney Act.
JANE M. JOZEFEK
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